On 6 February in KZ, Colonel V. Demidenko, a Soviet Air Force pilot ... remarked while Soviet fighters such as the Su-17 and MiG-23 could hardly be expected to counter U.S. F-15s, Iraqi MiG-29s were more than a match for U.S. aircraft. He concluded: "Even an average MiG-29 pilot has a better chance of emerging victorious in a dogfight than his adversary in an F-15, not to mention other aircraft."
Pravda, 18 January 1991. Two analysts observed: "We note that Soviet military equipment, of which Iraq has an abundance, has not shown itself at its best. Will anyone dare to buy it after such an obvious failure?"
Major General Viktor Filatov,... reported that the Iraqi army had shown "its bravery and courage" in a series of counterattacks which "smashed" allied forces in the Persian Gulf... [Filatov] asserted that American forces had not actually entered Kuwait on February 24, as announced, but remained inside Saudi Arabia on the defensive.
Reformists>Colonel Aleksandr Tsalko, who headed a Soviet Air Force Training Center prior to assuming his duties as a Soviet People's Deputy, observed that the crushing defeat of the Iraqi Army made it
clear the Soviet military doctrine and the entire model of military development were obsolete. On a 1 March Moscow Radio broadcast he stated:>Some military authorities in this country continue to believe that the outcome of a war is determined by a clash of huge masses of ground troops. It is sheer madness. The war in the Gulf
clearly showed that the Iraqi Army was simply overwhelmed by air strikes and the troops had to keep their noses buried in the sand.>Tsalko disagreed with those who claimed that the war demonstrated the inferiority of Soviet military equipment. "On many counts we are not so much behind." He stressed, however, that
the main lesson of the war was that huge amounts of tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery pieces were "absolutely useless."